Link between Hussein and 9/11 and al Queda was far from being self-evident
The legal restraint mostly spring from political. This is to say that domestic opposition to war in Iraq might be classified as being comprised of those yet to be persuaded and those opposing the president’s persuasion out of their own political views, thus, incapable of converting into proponents unless powerful justification campaign. The political restraints were mainly caused by the sheer number of those violently opposing and, as it is the principle of politics, to be overpowered by the simple majority.
To shape a majority, Bush needed a system of arguments pointed at substantiation the Iraqi leader implication with terrorists. Having the public’s justification on this important issue Bush would feel a great deal more secure with overcoming legal restraints. To shape the public thought seemed to be a main battlefield while legal justification was but tributary. On the way to public persuasion Bush faced the following constraints:
1. Link between Hussein and 9/11 and al Queda was far from being self-evident. Though “two days after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, a Time/CNN poll found that 78 percent of respondents thought that Saddam Hussein was involved with the attacks on the twin trade towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. ” (Pfiffner, 2004), the government officials were much more restrained in their support to Bush implication.
Further there might be observed a reverse process: after mobilizing the CIA reports government bureaucracy got increasingly committed to the idea, while the public, after recovering from first day hysteria, and, especially, after the first injuries report in Afghanistan, got cooled and less enthusiastic. The question whether that link really existed was left behind letting the question how the Iraq affair will benefit the cause of anti-terrorist war in. “The official quoted President Bush as telling Condi Rice, “I’m tired of swatting flies.
” Bush, this official says, wanted an aggressive scheme to take bin Laden out. ” (Isikoff, 2004). It seems Bush wanted to hit the target big enough to retaliate for Twin towers. Whether those intentions where fair or did Bush just misled the nation puting it closer to the disastorous morrow might not be revenant question for the essay but what Bush certainly managed to do is circumvent the public mistrust to his claims. Bush appropriated neutral or cautious discourse when dealing with the connection between al Queda and Iraq and tried to emphasise the general Good, resulting from Hussein regime’s overthrow.
The arguments about Iraq being a terrorist training base and the country leaders involvement with al Queda funding were general in character and contributed to the air of wickedness of the regime. It seems that Bush had strong personal prejudice against Hussein because the official rhetoric oscillated from one extremity into another: “the administration based part of its argument on a claim that 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta met with an Iraqi official in Prague in April 2001”(Pfiffner, 2004) which made them say that Iraqi official’s connections with al Queda was ‘bulletproof’.
The other day, September 18, President Bush conceded: “No, we’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th. ” (Pfiffner, 2004) He gave no explanation as to why the previously implied connection was abandoned. ” At first, administration directly accuses Hussaine of cooperation with terrorists which, if the solid evidences were at hand, alone will suffice to get Legal justificaation for the war, but after Bush replaces the emphasis on the anti-democratic character of the regime and Kurds abuses.
It tell that administartion had a paticular design for as ‘how to do Iraq’ but lacked public justification that is why the President and others have chosen controversial but actually effective tactics of ‘obscuring’ Iraq, aimed at gaining sympathy to the Presidents efforts and general apprehension of the obstruction which Iraqi regime makes to the ‘World free of terror’. Encouraging the general public believe and carefull phrasing while implying the Iraq and 9/11 connection in general terms is what enabled Bush circumvent the offshoots of public and offical opposition.
2. Existence of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons in Iraq was under question. What President did to circunvent this doubts was obscure the clasification. To substantiate the existance of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq would be much easier because there were numeorous reports of the UN and the international opinion on the matter was somewhat closer to concord. Iraq was reported to use chemical weapons against Kurds and have killed up to 5 thousand. Actually, chemical and biological weapons are less complicated to produce than nuclear.
It demand less funding and certainly the production of that weapons need less secrecy then, say, nuclear weapons production. For the latter vital importance have facilities for uranium enrichment that are technically complicated time and money consuming to produce and certainly they demand a skilled and professional personal to maintain. This looks to constitue a rather serious constarins even without the problem of how to acquire the raw material whcih in the process of enrichment wille eventually become capable of use. If one does not have the proper deposits of uranium or plutinium the only way is buy.
To bypass the international export control system seems to be one more problem. That is why international analysts presumed the existence of chemical or/ and biological weapons in Iraq or rather was half-convinced of that in the light of Kurds massacre and intelligence information. But what many or almost all did not believed in was that Iraqis managed to gain nuclear weapons, which was much more dangerous than any other. Bush did mix the terms. “Throughout the buildup to the war with Iraq, the administration consistently conflated biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD).
” Although the potentials of this three kind of weapona are not equal: “A successful attack with VX could kill thousands; with a BW agent, tens of thousands (chemical weapons); and with a nuclear weapon, hundreds of thousands or even millions” (Pollack 2002, 179) The virtual impossibility to deliver the chemical or biological weapons in the amount enough to produce effect which will come close to the effect of the nuclear attack gravely compromised the ability of that weapons successfull employment against the USA.
I think the effect of public persuation Bush sought was in this case due to the willfull extortion of the data and substitution of the terms. American public, which since the begginig of the Cold War is being very sensitive of the nuclear weapons issues, was brought to the point when that lawfull preoccupation played against them all, imparing vigilance and critical thinking ability. Bush and his aides did use the monolithic and grievous perception of the ‘nuclear weapon’ which denotes the ‘weapon of mass destruction’ and slip into the Iraqi issue already biased on by the many.
The idea was to find the less controversial weapons issue and to tie it to the notion of possible deadly use of this weapon which in the atmosphere of conspiracy hysteria will bring the mighty dividends. Apart from the public opinion persuasion issues, this is to say, domestic restraint on the way to the war declaration there were some restraints of rather technical character which were administration managed to overcome on the wave of exploiting public fears but as that restraints were inherent, even though left aside they do impede the freedom of Bush maneur by now.
I am talking about economy situation before the war and its aggravation during the war which contributed to the growing external debt of the USA. I am also talking about internal government and Senate opposition to the President’s particular decisions and style and especially the voices of those who admonished President and were rebuffed out of political and personal preferences; voices heard distinctly now that Bush seems to be insecure more than ever. 3. Economy slowdown as a restraint to the Iraqi campaign launch.
As a matter of fact, Bush has come to declare the war on world terrorism with a huge budget deficit. The term ’huge’ means that the budget deficit USA had could overnumber the budget of a middle size country. But Americans are used to live with deficit and have developed a theory that attributes the important role of economic grows’ factor to seemingly malignant economic phenomenon. Thus, right from the start the deficit and economic slowdown was not among the ‘deadly’ restraints on the way to war. Two factors are accountable of that.
First, Bush practically inherited the slowdown tendency from Clinton. To be precise, those factors that contributed to slowdown were shaped so as to impede the US economy mostly through the period of Clinton’s term, though the latter could not be fully inculpated in him. The international market crisis also stripped Bush of much of the guilt. The second factor that might comfort Bush was the support of Democratic Party. “With a few brave exceptions, Democrats embraced the premises of Bush’s pronouncement, supported his plans for hot war and elaborated their own ideas for defending the homeland.
” (Greider, 2004) So, Bush faced practically no hindrances to appropriate the budget to the ‘war on terror’ needs. Bush, thus, felt very comfortable on what he was about to do. No one seemed to put a pressure on him on the account of those inherited economic problems and everybody seemed to understand that the terrorists left him no choice other than launch a full-size war with all its entailments. “Said the White House’s Kaplan: “The president has been clear since the attacks of 9/11 that winning the war on terrorism, protecting the homeland, was in fact his highest priority.
So that’s where he has focused our resources” along with trying to strengthen the economy. Kaplan would not speculate on how Bush’s budget would be different with no war in Iraq, saying of the conflict: “That’s the world the president has had to deal with”. ( Diplomat News Service, 2004). The only thing unsure was that many Democrats had presentiments that the current Anti-terrorist operation will develop into all encompassing and resource consuming war akin to those named “Cold War”. In other words, war was not that which scared and shunned Democrats like Jim Nussle (Samuel, 2004).
It was rather a notorious “unseen and malignant” enemy so familiar from the Cold War rethorics, enemy which may make Republicans commit all resourses to the fight that terrified them most. In practical terms, the outcome of that endeavour which seemed to resemble a man toting the machine gun tryng to dispel a cloud of flies was more than doubtful. Though Democrats wished to eliminate the threat of terrorism there were some doubts on the matter of that threat. Bush seemed to fund the way to take away this little restraint. Government pictured the terrorists in the right light.
They are highly organised and have a number of training camp. Though those camps are scattered all over the world. They are endorsed by regimes. But those regimes are numerous. They are capitalised by the many and posses everything for an effective strife. Though the sources of their funding are obscure and hardly detectable. They are capable of momentous and diverse attacks simultaneously at several objects entailing numerous casualties. Though they are clandestine and freemasons like groups. Some of them may walk by as every day.
“Like the cold war’s, the logic of this new organizing framework can be awesomely compelling to the popular imagination because it runs on fear–the public’s expanding fear of potential dangers. The political commodity of fear has no practical limits. ”(Greider, 2004) With that portrait of terrorists at hands Bush was comfortable. He addressed simultaneously two issues: Democrats fears of long time engagement and those Democrats and public’s growing concerns about the methods of war. JFK’s famous phrase–“to pay any price, bear any burden” in defense of liberty and homeland was sweeping and effective until recently.
Greider, William. Under the banner of the ‘war’ on terror. Mark The Nation, June 21, 2004 v278 i24 p11 Pierce, Vanessa. (THE NATION)(Editorial) Wasteful Spending Thwarts Recovery; Although President Bush succeeded in reducing federal taxes, increased federal spending threatens to slow the economic growth that could result from his tax cuts. Mark Insight on the News, August 19, 2003 p28 Samuel, Terence. Bracing for a bruising budget battle. Mark U. S. News & World Report, March 22, 2004 v136 i10 p46 The Costs Of Iraq War. Mark APS Diplomat News Service, June 14, 2004 v60 i24 p0Sample Essay of AssignmentExpert.com