Objective Moral Facts
Constructivists, realists and relativists have debated on the issues of independence or variability of moral facts. Moral realists claim that moral truths and facts are objective. Moral facts are said to be objective because their nature and existence is independent of attitudes, theories and beliefs about them. A moral statement, if it is true, is independent of anyone’s thoughts about such a statement. The moral statement is true in the context of an objective moral fact. In order for the theory of moral realism to hold, two conditions or requirements must be met.
The first condition is that the basic concepts of what is right and good must have certain properties. The moral judgments involved must represent the moral facts in which the properties are present. The second condition should consist of a world where such moral properties are substantial and therefore, it should be a world where these facts exist (Dreier 2006). Moral realists have always believed in the existence of moral facts. An action is said to be morally right or wrong when an objective fact exists for that particular which is right or wrong.
A specific action is right or wrong even when no one believes the action is right or wrong. In this sense, moral facts do not depend on moral claims. The existence of independent moral facts provides objective truths concerning moral matters. Consequently, since moral facts are objective, meaningful and significant moral discussions are allowed in which a moral statement may be able to exert force. The existence of moral facts will allow people to select from two alternative courses of action and justify their actions.
People can also make judgments about others because of the objective moral facts are universal in nature. The question of objective moral facts has been answered by the moral realists and skeptics with opposing views of the matter. Moral realists believe that objective moral facts do exist provided that certain conditions are met. Moral skeptics believe that moral facts are not needed to explain a moral observation so therefore, they do not exist. Reference Dreier, J. (2006) ‘Contemporary debates in moral theory’, Wiley-Blackwell Publishing
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